NTSB: El Faro's boilers needed service

Investigators release update on tragedy that killed 33 crew members

JACKSONVILLE, Fla. – The National Transportation Safety Board issued another report on the El Faro tragedy Tuesday, saying a recent inspection recommended service to both boilers on the cargo ship.

An inspector recommended that service just days before El Faro set sail from Jacksonville, heading to Puerto Rico as Hurricane Joaquin churned just off the Bahamas.

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TOTE Maritime, the ship's operator, issued a statement responding to the NTSB report:

"The NTSB is the organization leading the investigation, in which we are fully cooperating, and has contracted with the Navy to search for the Voyage Data Recorder. We are deeply appreciative of the resources and equipment extended to the search by the Navy and U.S. government, which are some of the most sophisticated in the world. Everything we know about the vessel we are sharing with the NTSB."

The ship's boilers produce steam that runs through a steam turbine and turns the propeller, and attorney Rod Sullivan, a maritime expert who is not affiliated with the case, said they could have played a big role in the ship losing power in the middle of the hurricane.

"Ships just don't stop. Somebody actually had to turn that steam off to the steam turbine and the only reason they would do that is if there were some major problem, probably with the boilers," Sullivan said.

IMAGES: NTSB investigation of El Faro tragedy

An annual inspection of El Faro was completed by U.S. Coast Guard inspectors in San Juan, Puerto Rico, on March 6, 2015.

In June 2015, an American Bureau of Shipping surveyor examined and tested the main, auxiliary and emergency systems and found them to be satisfactory.

TOTE Maritime told investigators El Faro was scheduled to be removed from the route between Jacksonville and San Juan and redeployed to the West Coast where it would operate between Washington state and Alaska.

In August, in order to prepare for this change, TOTE began making modifications to the vessel. Welders and machinists performed these modifications over many voyages, including the voyage where the El Faro sank in the Atlantic Ocean.

On Sept. 11, TOTE received permission from the Coast Guard to shut down one of the ship's two boilers so it could be inspected by an independent boiler service company during a voyage between San Juan and Jacksonville.

As a result of the inspection, the boiler service company recommended service to both boilers during an upcoming drydock period that had already been scheduled for Nov. 6.

The boiler was returned to service after the inspection.

On Oct. 1, two days after leaving Jacksonville, El Faro's captain called the company's emergency call center saying he had a marine emergency. He reported that there was a hull breach, a scuttle had blown open, and that there was water in hold No. 3. He also said that the ship had lost its main propulsion unit and the engineers could not get it going.

"The real question is, if you have two boilers and one of them fails, why can't you keep running the ship on one boiler? And the captain here reports that the ship completely stopped," Sullivan said. "The engines are not turning at all for some reason and they are taking on water, so that indicates they have some problem that's not just with one boiler that is with both boilers."

The NTSB report did not establish that the boilers caused the ship to sink.

Just hours before that call, the captain emailed a company safety official that he intended to take a route south of the predicted path of the hurricane and would pass about 65 miles from its center.

The Weather Authority's Rebecca Barry described the conditions the ship would have faced.

"He was expecting to pass about 65 miles south of the eye," Barry said. "He would have been in tropical storm force winds but not necessarily hurricane force winds if this had verified and if he had lost power. And so this forecast also called for a turn to the northwest the next day on Thursday, but if you watch the track, it didn't turn until early Friday."

Sullivan said the timeline in the NTSB report shows what happened to sink the ship happened fast.

"What it appears is that the situation developed very quickly," Sullivan said. "I mean the total of time between the communications saying that they were in distress and signals disappearing is a mere matter of six to 10 minutes."

Sullivan said with the ships design and the way the water entered it, it couldn't stay afloat long before sinking.

"If they have a breach of the hull and water is coming in, there is no segregation between a lot of these decks, so water comes in one place and it spread out throughout the ship and that could cause it to break in half and sink very quickly," Sullivan said.

The NTSB has contracted the U.S. Navy, the USNS Apache to find the ship, document the wreckage and recover the voyage data recorder.

Sullivan said when the ship arrives it will have a narrow window of time to find the data recorder. The VDR's batteries last about 30 days, and it's been three weeks since the El Faro left Jacksonville.

The NTSB is still investigating, and Sullivan said there are many questions yet to be answered.

"I think that finding out what the brick repairs were recommended and being done on the boilers is going to be key in determining why they decided to shut down the turbines," Sullivan said. 

More from the NTSB report

Interviews of relief crew and company management indicated that onboard safety drills were consistently conducted on a weekly basis. These included lifeboat drills for all crew members to ensure that all on board understood their responsibilities in an emergency.

Investigators interviewed two pilots that had guided El Faro in and out of the Port of Jacksonville. Both reported that the vessel handled similarly to other vessels of its size and type.

The vessel's terminal manager reported that El Faro met stability criteria when it left Jacksonville.

The company's procedures called for some cargo on the ship to be "double lashed" regardless of the weather expected to be encountered during the voyage. The vessel stevedores reported that prior to El Faro's departure on the accident voyage, the cargo was secured in accordance with those procedures.

Timeline on El Faro's last voyage

Before El Faro departed Jacksonville, Tropical Storm Joaquin was predicted to become a hurricane and a marine hurricane warning was issued by the National Hurricane Center at 5 p.m. on Sept. 29.
At about 8:15 p.m. that night, El Faro departed Jacksonville for San Juan, Puerto Rico.

At 1:12 p.m. on Sept. 30, the captain emailed a company safety official that he intended to take a route south of the predicted path of the hurricane and would pass about 65 miles from its center.

In an advisory issued at 2 a.m. on Oct. 1, the National Hurricane Center predicted seas of 30 feet with sustained winds of 64 knots (74 mph), increasing to 105 knots (121 mph) as the El Faro approached the wall of the eye of the hurricane.

In a recorded satellite phone call to the company's emergency call center at 7 a.m., the captain told the call center operator that he had a marine emergency.

He reported that there was a hull breach, a scuttle had blown open, and that there was water in hold No. 3.

He also said that the ship had lost its main propulsion unit and the engineers could not get it going. The operator then connected the captain with the Designated Person Ashore (DPA).

The DPA told investigators that the captain had communicated similar information to him that was provided to the call center operator, and also that the captain had estimated the height of the seas that El Faro was encountering to be 10 to 12 feet.

The USCG received electronic distress alerts from three separate sources on El Faro: the Ship's Security Alert System (SSAS), the Inmarsat-C Alert, and the Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB).

According to electronic alert system data sent by the vessel at 7:17 a.m. on Oct. 1, its last reported position was about 20 miles from the edge of the eye of the hurricane.

The USCG did not have direct voice communications with El Faro, only electronic distress alerts.

What's next in the investigation?

The NTSB investigators who traveled to Florida have returned to continue work on the investigation from NTSB headquarters in Washington.

The NTSB contracted with the U.S. Navy to locate the ship, document the wreckage on the sea floor and recover the voyage data recorder.

The USNS Apache, a fleet ocean tug, was outfitted with specialized equipment for this mission, and departed Little Creek, Virginia on Oct. 19.

In addition to the Navy crew, the NTSB investigator-in-Charge, Tom Roth-Roffy, is on Apache with representatives from the USCG, TOTE and ABS, all parties to the NTSB investigation.

The Apache is estimated to arrive at the last known position of El Faro on Saturday to begin the search for the ship and to recover the voyage data recorder. Once the search operation begins, it is expected to take at least two weeks.

Updates on the search for the vessel and the accident investigation will be issued as circumstances warrant, according to the NTSB.